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ABSTRACT 
L ittle is known about the work ing relationships Memb e rs 
of P arl iament form with local e l e c te d  and p e rmanent o f f ic ials in 
the ir c ons tituenc ies . Th is is a case s tudy of one cons tituency 
b ased on interviews of a s ample of d is trict and country counc illors , 
l ocal o f f icers ,  party agents and activists as we l l  as th e Member 
h ims e l f .  S everal ob servations are made in this s tudy .  First, l ines 
of cooperation in this constituency were much more partisan than is 
typ ically f o und in the United S tates . Second,  th e Member mus t 
apparently maintain a care ful b alance between f os tering good relations 
with l ocal b ureaucrats in order to obta in the ir c ooperation and b e ing 
the ir c ritic in order to claim credit.  Lastly , an incre ase in the 
cons tituency orientation o f  one cand idate seems to lead to an 
increas e in the cons tituency orientation of the other. Candidates can 
apparently be l oc ked into a h i gh level of cons tituency s e rv ice by 
the expec tations they build up among cons tituents . 
A CONSTITUENCY M . P .  AND HIS LOCAL 
COMMUNITY : A CASE STUDY 
Bruce E. Cain and Dav i d  B.  Rit chie 
Re l a t ions between M . P . s  and t h e ir cons t ituency par t ie s  
have b e e n  cal le d  " the s ecre t  g ar den o f  British polit ics . "  
(Ranney ,  1965). The same cou l d  b e  s aid o f  relatio ns b e tween 
M. P . ' s  and their co ns t ituencies generally. One impor tant asp e ct 
of this rela t ionship is the handling o f  citizen comp la i nt s .  There 
is gr owing evidence that M . P . s devote a s ig nif i cant amount o f  
their scarce t ime and meager s t a f f  resour ces t o  ombudsman-like 
activ it i es on behalf of their cons t i tuents (Dowse , 1963; Bar ker
and Ru s h ,  1970; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina , 198 0). The volume 
of  const ituent comp la ints is of ten l arge , excee ding in some
ins tances 100 cases per week. Traditio na l ly ,  Member s have 
intervened into disputes b etween cit izens and the bureau cracy over 
such matters as  immigr atio n  status , taxa t i o n ,  socia l s erv ice s ,  
pensio ns o r  the milit ary because their a cces s  t o  minis ters could 
pres sure the bureaucr acy into changing it s p o l icies and proce dures . 
By co ntra s t ,  l ocal au thor ity i s sues have not always been considered 
the Membe r's respons ib il ity. I ncr easing ly ,  however , M . P . a  have 
been a s ke d  to deal with lo ca l authority complaint s .  Thes e  include 
hou s i ng especial l y ,  but also s u ch diverse prob lems as e du ca t ion, 
p l anning de cis ions , environmenta l issues , and dispu tes b e tween 
f amily and neighbor s .  Many M. P .  s have accepted the respons ib ility 
of dea l ing with these demands . A recent s urvey of M. P . s  and their 
agents for ins tance reveale d  tha t 55 p e r cent of them thought that 
it was their respons ib ility to  dea l  with l ocal ca ses while 45 
percent s a i d  that it  was no t (Ca i n ,  Ferejohn and Fior ina , 1980) . 
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One d imension of this trend which has so f ar been 
unexp lored is t he rea ctio n  o f  the loca l  community to the greater 
cons t i tuency invo lvement of the M . P .  By ta king up loca l  complaints 
a nd by leading campaigns against unpopular local government 
decisi o ns , the M. P. mus t regularly deal w i t h  both e l e cted and 
permanent lo cal o f f icia l s .  This raises various que s t ions about 
how the M. P .  works with council lors and o f f icer s  to  handle l ocal 
grievances and about what t hey in turn t h i nk of t he Member 's 
immer s io n  in the cons t ituency af fair s .  
I n  an at temp t to  a s s e s s  wha t happ e ns when a n  M.P . b e comes 
active in his or her cons tituency , we have made a s tu dy of one cas e 
where both the newly elected and recently defeated M. P . s devot e d  a 
great deal o f  e f f o r t  to cons t i t u ency af fairs . We i nt erviewed a sample 
o f  the dis trict and county councillors, local o f f icers ,  party agents
a nd activis t s  as  well as the two M. P .s themselves. We asked the same 
q u e s t io ns to all interviewees , but we also e ncouraged them to 
provide any further informa tion they though t r elevant . The is sues 
we address using this materia l  are f ir s t ,  how did the former Labour 
member get heavily involved in his cons t ituency's af fairs; seco ndly, 
wha t  sort  o f  interactions did he have with the council lors and 
permanent local officials; t hir dl y ,  how did these o f f icials react to
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his locally-orien ted cons t ituency s t y l e; and lastly , what e f f ec t  did 
t he Labour member's s trat egy have on t h e  Conserva tiv e  candidat e 's 
behavior both during and af t er the campaign? S inc e this is a case 
s tu dy of one constituency only , the implica t ions of our f indings f o r  
behavior acro ss a l l  con s t ituencies are necessarily t en t a t ive. 
THE STRATEGY OF LOCAL INVOLVEMENT 
When the new Labour M . P.  won a close ele c t ion in 1974, 
he sought to es tab lish h imself in the  c ons t ituency by t a king a 
keener in tere s t  in its a f f airs than ha d previous Members . He 
did t h is in severa l way s .  To begin wit h ,  he t r ie d  t o  be seen 
in the cons t ituency as mu ch as possib l e  by at t ending numerous 
g ar den f e t e s , bazaar s  an d socia l  even t s . Fre quent con tact with 
his cons t i tuen t s ,  he had hoped, woul d c onvey c oncern f o r  them 
1.ndiv idua l l y  and f o r  the con s t ituency g enera l ly .  He al so made 
a habit of a t t ending a number of cons t ituency pa rty functions 
and GMC meet ings s ince he though t these appearance s  might be  useful 
f or bu ilding up the mor ale o f  the lo cal p ar ty and for f o s t e r ing 
g oo d  r e l a t ions with party a c t iv is t s .  
The Labour Member also unde r t oo k  a very ac t ive advo cacy 
o f  constitue11cy interests  in P arliament . S ever a l  of those
int erv iewed f or ins t ance ment ioned his campaign to de f end a loc al 
hospital  against  closure,  and i t  was evident f r om their r emar ks  
that he had earned a great dea l  o f  c redit in their eyes  f o r  his 
ef fort s .  Of course, the Member s '  forma l  powers in such ma t ters are 
extremely l imited.  Unlike their American counterpar t s ,  M.P.s c annot 
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use a key position on a commit t e e  to block the governmen t 's a c t ion and 
mus t rely on their ability to focus pub l ic ity on the is sue and to lobby 
minis ters in Parliament . 
The thir d, an d mos t controversial, aspect o f  t he Labour 
M . P . 's strategy was his heavy invol vement in local casewo r k .  The
Labour Memb e r  claimed to receive 10,000 l etters and b e tween 4,000 
and 5,000 cases per y ear . Of these,  the largest numb er were hous ing 
cases . Some cases were referred to the dis tr i c t  council lors , 
but the  M.P. dea l t  with mos t  personally.  As a consequence ,  he had
become, in his word s ,  "gros s ly involve d in cons t ituency a ffairs." 
When Parliament was in s es s ion, he was spend ing two to three hours 
every morning and mos t o f  the weekends on surgeries , mail, personal 
appearances and mee t ings. Ins t ea d  o f  ho l ding s urgeries in fixe d 
locat ions once or twice a month, as do mos t M . P . s ,  h e  took a mobile 
surgery around the cons t i tuency every wee k .  He had homes l eafleted 
with mess ages encouraging cons t i tuents to b ring their prob lems to 
him . In a ddi tion , s ince he was a journ a l i s t  by t rade ,  he was very 
good at s ecuring pub lic i ty for h is ac t ivi t ies , o f ten producing three 
or  four a r t ic les a week in the loca l  pap e r .  Publlc izing successful
cases us ua l ly generated "a  rash o f  ' me too' l e t te rs , "  fur t he r  rais ing 
the demand f o r  h is s ervi ces . I n  e f f ect ,  C orb e t t 's a t t itude t owar ds 
casework was ent repreneurial:  he was not simply meet ing a fixed 
demand for ombu<lsmen-like act ivities,  rather h e  was s timu l ati ng a 
greater demand f o r  them . 
What , one migh t a s k ,  did the M . P .  hope to achieve by 
thes e  a c t ivit ies?  One goal  seems t o  have b e en t o  es tablish 
electoral credit. He tho u�1t that by taking up all sorts of cases, 
he wo uld not only win the s upport o f  those who were d ire ctly 
a ided , b ut a lso create for h ims e l f  h igh name recognition and the 
reputation f or being a good constitue ncy man. A l though he was 
d e f eated in the May 1979 General E le c tion , he  co uld c la im some 
success in a ch ieving his e l e ctoral goals . A p o l l  conducted in 
one of the areas where he had concentrated h i s  cas ework activities 
showed greater than 80 p ercent name r e cognition . On th e o ther 
hand , his e f forts d id not keep h im in of f ice . Even tho ugh he had 
expec ted the e l ectoral advantage to b e  margina l ,  he had  hoped tha t  
it would b e  suf f icient to enab le h im to with s tand a moderate swing 
to the Conservatives . As it turned o ut ,  the n ational swing was 
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not moderate and although he beat the regional swing by 5 percentage
po ints , it was not enough to o f fs e t  the large swing to the 
Conse rva tives in the S o uth . 
A s eco nd motivation for  the Labour Member' s activities 
was his desire to please the local p arty activis ts. He b e l ie ves 
that h is local connec tions had been a factor in his s e l e ction. 
As a long time res ide nt o f  the community , he knew the particular 
needs and demands of the cons tituency , and this had given h im a 
" leg up" on the outside candid a tes.  Also,  h is pl e<lge to d e fe nd 
constituency interests more clos ely th an previous Memb ers had 
made a favourab l e  impres s ion upon the se lection committee .  There 
were other advantages tha t  might come f rom f ul f il l ing his s el e ction 
speech promises such as build ing up the mora le o f  the party activ i sts 
and increasing local membership and enthus iasm for party work .  He 
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also hoped tha t  i t  might b uy h im some much-needed personal c red i t  
with his activists in the event that they might d isagree over policy.  
I n  fact, the s uc e s s  o f  h is strategy v i s-a-v i s  party activists 
was , like the electoral goa l , somewhat mixed . D i s cuss ions w i th local 
Labour party o f f icers ind i ca ted that the Labour Member was wid e ly 
regarded insid e  his constituency Labour p arty as a good constituency 
man . He was we l l  l iked and people acknowledged that he kept in to uch 
w ith the party's activi sts . S ti ll, h i s  "grass rootin g" d id not prevent 
oppos i tion to his positions from w i thin the party . In partic ular , 
le f t-wing party members were cr itical of him f o r  not taking a stronger 
s tand against the Labour governme nt' s  pub lic exp e nd i ture cut s .  As one 
party o f f icer p ut it, rela ti ons between the Labour Member and h i s  
l o c a l  party were "good mos t  o f  the time , but not excel l ent . "  The 
p o s si b i li ty that h i s  relations with the pa rty might have been wor s e  
had he no t kep t in c lo se touch i s  rea l ,  b ut o f  nece s s i ty a matter o f
spe c ul ation . 
Loo king at the overall impact of the Labo ur Membe r ' s
constituency strategy , it is easy to see several possib le 
sour ce s  o f  tens ion . Maintaining high visibility in the 
constituency meant that he would b e  d rawing atte ntion and 
p ub licity away f rom ambitious local politicians , a nd that he 
would find it harder to stay o ut o f  local controver sies wh i ch 
might potentially split his suppnrt . Handling lo cal cases might 
be seen as "med d ling" in the a f fairs of local permanent o f f ic ia l s
and o f  the l o c a l  council. A d d e d  t o  these problems w a s  that of  
a loca l  council dominated b y  the opposing party during his las t
three years in office . Given these cond itions , the difficullies 
the Labour Member encoun tered were no t all that su rpris ing . 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE M. P.  AND 
THE LOCAL P ERMA NE NT OFFICIALS 
Relat ions with permanent local o f fi cials in the 
cons t i t uency are o f  c ru c i a l  impo rt ance for those Members who 
handle lo cal cas es regularly . Good contacts  fac ilit a t e  t h e  
resolution o f  cases bo t h  in the s e n s e  t h a t  req uests are les s  
7 
likely to be r e l egated to the bo t tom o f  the file and a ls o  that  
Members who kno w o ffic ials we ll can develop info rmal s ignal ling 
conven t i ons which allow the one to know the o ther ' s  t rue intenti ons . 
The la t t e r  is par t ic ularly important in those ins t ances when the 
Member needs t o  demons t r a t e  s incere e ffort t o  h i s  or h e r  
cons t i t uent, but d o e s  not t h ink that the const i t uent has a valid 
c la im. When r e la t ions are c lo s e ,  the H.P. can indicate  to the
official that only the forma li t ies need be obs erved . The H.P. 
gets a le t t er h e  can show h i s  cons t i tuent as p roo f of h is e ffort 
wh i le the permanen t o fficial is  spared making a special effo r t  
f o r  an unwo rt hy ca se. Since s ome propo r t ion a re hope l e s s  or 
crank ca s es .  bo th the M. P .  and t h e  o fficL1l need the pro t ection 
such lnfo rmal rela t ions provide.  
In this  c ons t i t u ency, the Labour Member was forced to deal 
with the Chief Executive p rimarily and was unable to  d evelop an 
extensive s et o f  working relations with lower levl'l d epartment 
offic ials. The Chief l·:xecu t -lve referred to tlds as their "arrangement" 
8 
but d id no t t e ll us much abo u t  h o w  or why the " arrangement" came abo u t .  
I t  was only later t h a t  we d is covered that  t he Labour Member h a d  been 
d enied d irect  a cc e s s  to o ffi cers in vario us departments because i t  
was felt that  h e  had abused h i s  p riv i lege by public i zing the d e t ails 
o f  c ases  too freque n t ly . S ignifican t ly, nei ther of the Conservat ive
Members before or after h im had been forced into such an arr angement . 
The Labour Member's s t and ard procedures fo r handling a 
local cas e were to refer it to local council lo rs when he  
could o r  to  channel the reques t to t he Chief Execu tive who 
would for ward it to the relevant departme nt: from there , it 
would be passed on to the appropria t e  o fficer. The lo cal 
permanent officials we re able to J_ns i s t  that h e  s end cas es th rough 
the Chief Execu tive, bec ause in th eir view the Member had no 
rights  or powers in t he s e  affairs and their coopera t ion was a 
ma t t e r  of "c o u r t esy".  As a resul t of t h is impo s e d  s creening 
sys tem, t here was a cons iderable amount o f  intera c t ion be t ween 
the Ch i e f  Execut ive and the H.P. A typic al wee k  would bring 
s ix to t en le t ters from t h e  Member to the Chi e f  Execut ive . By 
comp aris on, reques t s  from the Labour Member were only a small 
t rickle in t he enormous flo w of one hundred le t ters or so per d ay 
to c e r t a in d epar tments such as Housing and Heal t h .  The s upply o f  
d e s i r able counc i l  homes i n  t h i s  con s t ituency a s  in many areas i n  
Brita in is far les s than t he d emand for them so t h a t  waits o f  u p  to
t wo to three years are no t uncommon. Und er s uch cond i t ions , 
cons t i t uent s  naturally feel very in t ens e l y  about hous ing i s s ues , 
and compla i n t s  are voluminous . A complaint end o r s ed by t he M. P . ,  
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however, was comparatively inf requent.  The D i  rec tor o f  Housing and 
Health est imated that app roximately 95 percent of all housing reque s t s
went t hrough no rmal bureauc ra t i c  c hanne ls , 4 t o  5 percent came through
the loc al councillors and less than 1 percent came t hrough the  M.P. 
As a cons equence of their f re quen t  dealings toge ther, 
the Labour Member and the Chief  Execut i ve deve loped fai rly 
clo se wo rking rela t ions . A t  the s ame t ime , i t  was a guarded 
relationship.  The Chief  Execut i ve took special care not t o  b e  
pulled in a p a r t isan d i re c t i on ,  p articularly s ince t h e  d i s t r i c t  
council was p redominantly C onservat i ve .  There was a lways the 
dange r ,  he exp lained , t hat his s ta tements would b e  used 
poli t i cally by the Labour M . P .  in his s t ruggle with the  counc il . 
The Chief Executive felt that there was always an underly i ng 
tens ion b e t ween the need to work c losely wi th the M . P .  to 
ensure that compla i nts were dealt wi th exped i t i ous ly on the 
one hand and the need to main t ai n  a sa f e  d i stance to stay out 
of poli t ical fights on the o ther. 
Given that t he M . P .  has no f o rmal powe r  in local affairs, 
we as ked several local of f i c i als why , and in what  ways , they 
paid a t t en t ion to the Membe r ' s  reque s t s .  The Hous i ng D irector 
told us that a c omplaint coming from an M.P. did not get special 
t reatment per se: if the complaint was unjus t if i e d, th ere would
be no special c ir cums t ances applied to it . H oweve r ,  the M.P. 's 
en<Jui ry was usually given a hig il er priority in the sense that
where tile normal t ime for a reply was about four monLl1s, the 
dcparlllll'nl would li:rndll' tile M.l'. ' s  requesl i.n :i rnatt<·r of day s.
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As for why the M . P.  's re<JLWSt received a high e r  priorii:y, 
there were t wo responses . One , already men t ioned , was t h a t  wh i le 
it was not  a "duty" or "ri gh t ", the M.P. was ent i t led to a p rompt
reply as a matter  of "courtesy." But in addit ion , it was b a s ed 
on a warine s s  of the cons e quences of not res ponding p roperly . 
As one o f f i c i a l  frankly admit ted , an M.P. 's le t te r  was viewed wi th
apprehens ion s i nce in mos t  c ases , if the le t ter got that far, i t  
ind i c a t ed that  the compla i n t  was impor t an t . When asked wh at would 
happen if t hey did not  respond , we wer e  told that the M . P .  could 
cause a great  deal o f  t rouble by g i ving the depa rtment bad 
pub li c i t y. The fear o f  a messy , p ub li c  row formed a s t rong incen t i ve 
to comply . Thus , the M . P. 's in f luence in these mat ters deri ves 
both from the courtesy o f  good working relations wi th permanent 
o f f i c ia ls and from the i mp l i c i t  threat of p ub li c  exposure of
departmental or ind i vi d ual incompeten ce .  
N o t  surp ris i ngly, t he Labour M e mb e r  was viewed with s ome 
suspic ion by the local authorit ies. The fac t  o f  recurring intervent ion 
by the  M. P .  was p re t ty much acc ep ted by all o f  them as "part o f  the 
normal d emocra t ic p rocess." S t ill , a coup le fel t  that the M . P . was 
mo st us eful when he dealt with complain t s  and lobbied f or the 
c onstituency a t  the national level .  The Chief  Execut ive t old us, for 
examp le ,  that idea lly c o mplain t s  should come through normal bureauc ratic 
c hannels and no t by the poli tical route, and that the M . P .  should b e  
able t o  c oncentrat e on na t ional affai rs and leave loc al mat ters t o  
the c ounci llors . None thele s s ,  h e  acknowledged tha t t h e  ind i vidual
M.P. ult ima t e ly had to have the discre tion to choose his or her o wn 
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style of representation. Moreover, it was c lear that the constitu ents 
now expecte d  their M . P .  to be ac tive in constituency a f fairs. 
CASEWORK AND COUNCILLORS 
Lo cal c as es brough t  the Labour Member into frequent 
contact with dis trict and county council lors as well as w ith 
local dep artment o f f icials , b ecause h i s  s e rv ices overlapped, and 
in some s ense compete d, with those o f  the coun c illors . For 
example , many of the cases h e  receiv e d  cou l d  h ave been sent to 
the councillors. Inde e d, s ome M.P.s and councillors maintain 
that local autho rity complaints such as hous ing, e ducation , or  
roadworks should not real ly be  sent to the M . P . at a ll .  A 
comb ination o f  f actors -- the lower salience o f  councill o r s ,  
the f ac t  that councillors a r e  part-time , a n d  the expectations 
o f  cons tituents -- h ave increas ingly p laced more o f  the burden
on the M . P . 's s houl ders.  In s ome instances , the M . P. gets the 
cas e after it has been initial ly h an dl e d  by the c ounc illors , but 
in many instances , loc a l  cases c ome to the M.P. direc tly . 
Mo st o f  the counc i llor s  we interviewe d handled c i ti zen 
co Mplaints anc1. thouf!ht that i t  was an important aspect of their j ob .  
When our samp le was asked what they cons i de r e d  to be the i r  role in 
the cons tituency, 47  p er c ent mentioned their j ob as a go -b e tween
f or c i tizens with complaints about local government (se e  Table 1) . 
Onl y a very sma l l  minority s a i d  that the i r  r esponsib ility was pol icy 
making only and not casework. There was some par tisan di f f erence in 
the way that the counc illors def ined the i r  role.  Labour counci l lors 
were more inc lined to mention casework than their Conservative 
counterparts, hut this could be  true for a numbe r  of reasons. 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
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One p lausi b l e  explanation is tha t having a Labour M . P .  who was active 
i n  casework s erved to inc rease the involvement of the Labour 
counc i l lors.  Thi s  was certa inly the Labour Member's perc eption o f  
the s i tuation,  and, as w e  shall see ,  there is some evidence that h e  
as r ight. 
As i s  evi dent in Table 2, c ounc illors handled far f ewer
cases than either of the two Members in part, of course , because 
the i r  j ur i s di ctions are much sma l l er . Compared to the Labour Member's 
eighty cases per week and to h i s  succes sor's twenty -five per week, the 
c ounc i l lors reporte d  handling an average of four cases per week. The 
average , of cours e ,  h i des some dispersion.  A couple of counc illors 
on key committees repo rted ca seloads in the 15-20 per week range , but
on the who l e ,  i t  is s a f e  to s ay that indivi dual councillor caseloads 
are very light. In addi tion, most do no t ho l d  surgeries. In s everal 
i nstance s ,  the c ounc i l lors had apparently tried to h o ld regular 
surgeries, but discovere d  in the end that the yi eld in cases di d not 
j us ti fy the e f fort. Most o f  the counc i llors also reported that they 
did no t actively seek out c ase s .  A f ew periodica lly attended Corbett's 
surgeries to help with the local c ases he r eceived, but mos t  waite d  
unti l a cons ti tuent initiated a compla int before they took action . 
As Table 2 shows, there was some di f ference between the parties
TABLE 1 
PERCE IVED ROLE I N  THE CONSTITUE NCY 
ALL CONS . L/\llOR 
COUNCILLORS COUNCILLORS 
Hand l ing Con sti tuent 4 7  16 31 
Complaints (15) (5) ( 10) 
Representing Wa rd 22 13 9 
Interests (7) (4) (3) 
Overseeing Local 25 9 1 6  
Aut hority Po licy (8) (3) (5) 
3 0 3 
Support ing Party (1) (0) (l) 
28 16 6 
General 
Re pres entation (9 ) (5 ) (2) 
3 3 0 
A t t end Meet i ngs (1) (1) (0) 
Policy Mat t ers 
On ly no ind i vidual 6 6 0 
Complai nts (2) (2) (0) 
n = 4 5  
Pe rcent ages are those of t ot a l  s ample who mention a particular 
ca tq.\•H.v i.n l' i Lher first o r  second response t o  t he q ues ti o n  of 
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I ND 
0 
(O) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
what their mos t  impo r tant res p o ns ib ili t i es are. Numbers o f  r e s po ns es 
are i n  parenthes es .  
llo 
in t e rms of hol ding surgeries and s o liciting cases , but as be fore, 
this too  may be explained by t he p a r t i s an l i nes o f  cooperation 
bet ween the M . P .  and the councillors i n  t hi s  c onstituency . 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Cooperation b e t we en t he counc i l l o r  and t h e  M . P .  took 
t wo f o rms . M . P. s pas s ed c e r t a i n  s o r t s  of c as es along to th e 
councillors and they in t u r n  r e fe r re� o th ers to the Memb e r .  
I nst ances o f  bo th were f airly f re quent i n  t h e  constituency we 
s t u d i ed.  Approximat ely 89 percent of the counc i l lo rs we i nterviewed 
at o ne t ime or ano th e r  h ad a case referred to them by o ne o f  th e 
Memb ers . S i nc e  the Conse rva tive M.P. had jus t  been elec t ed at 
the time of the i nt erviews and five y ears had el aps ed since the 
las t Co ns ervat ive had h e ld the s eat , the bulk of the repo r t ed 
referrals had come from th e d e fea t e d  Labour Memb e r . O f  those 
who did g et r e ferrals from t h e  M.P., mos t did  not g e t  many . The 
greatest proporti o n  got  f e wer than t wenty c a s es p er year ,  b ut a 
small numb er o f  Labour councillor s  reported that they rec eived one 
hund r ed or  more c a ses  p er y ear . It seems, then , tha t  the Labour 
Member rel ied very h eavily on a f ew counc i l lors to help him with 
his casework rather than d is tr i b u t i ng the load evenly. 
A striking featur e  of referrals from the Membe r is th e 
degree to whicl1 they followed partisan lines. Members i n  this 
constituency were more likely to refer cases to councillors o f
their o wn p<l rty th<1n to those o I '  the oppo:·d ng p<irtv. /\ l  l 
rererretls tu the L.;1hour cunnc i. I Lo rs i.n our s�mp It' c:1me from 
TABLE 2 
CO UNCILLOR CASEWORK ACTIV ITY 
Ave rage # of Cas es 
Per Week
Percent who hold 
surge ries 
Percent who seek 
out  case s
Most frequent type s  
of Cases
A LL 
4 
22 
(7) 
22 
(7) 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
CON SERVATIVE 
COUNCILLORS 
4 
3 
(1) 
6 
(2) 
Hous ing 1. Housing
Road works 2. Ed ucat ion
E duca t ion 3. Roadwo rks 
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LABOR 
COUNCILLORS 
4-5 
19 
(6) 
16 
( 5) 
1. Hous ing
2 .  Roadworks 
3 .  S o cial 
Services 
4.  V and alis m
t h e  Labour Member and none came from e ither t h e  past o r  present 
Conservat ive member s. Mor eover, the six who repo r t ed referrals in 
exc e s s  o f  one hundred per year were all Labour council l o rs .  B y  
contras t ,  eight o f  the  Conservative counc illors had never received 
a referral from the  Labour Memb er ,  inc l ud ing four who had never 
received a c a s e  from any M . P .  Also , among t ho se who had rec eived 
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cases from an M . P . , the Conserva tive c o unc jllor s  t ended to g et f ewer 
than the Labour councillors.  
[ INSERT TABLES 3 /\NTl 4 HERE ) 
There were several reasons o f fe re d  as t o  why the M . P . 
re ferred cas es to the counci l lo rs .  The most co nunon ,  e speci ally 
among Conservat ive coun c i llors, was that t h ey o ccup ied a ke y 
pos i tion on a co nun i t t e e  w i th jur i sdi ction over the cas e -- for
examp l e ,  the  housing committ ee .  Another frequent  response ,  d ivi ded
evenly among counci llors from bo th part i es , was that the M.P. h ad 
sent c ases along to them because they had more t ime, or were in a 
b e t t er position to deal wit h t h e  problem adequately. In particular , 
severa l  Labour counc illo r s  indicat ed that t heir coo p er a t ion had b een 
essentia l  because, as  d i s cu s s ed earli er , the Labour member had been 
denied acc ess to  lower l ev e l  d epar tment of ficials. When the Labour 
Member needed to g e t  i n  touch wi t h  local o f f icials in cer tain 
departments wit ho u t  going through the Chief Executive, he  would t urn 
to his c o unc illors. The need for direct , unmediated contac t with t he 
local depart ments was there fore the third reason for r eferrals to 
TABLE 3 
REFERRAL FROM M. P .  TO COUNCI LLORS 
ALL CON SERVATIVE 
Yes , f rom Labor only 50 6 
(16) (2) 
Yes , from Conserva t ive 13 1 3  
only (4) (4) 
Yes , from both 13 1 3  
(4) (4) 
n = 24 
TABLE 4 
FREQUENCY OF REFERRALS TO COUNCILLORS 
ALL CON SERVATIVE 
6 6 
I nfrequen t ly (2) (2) 
JO 15 
1-20 per year (10) ( 5) 
9 3 
20-40 pe r year (3) (1) 
18 0 
100 P l us (6) (0) 
3 0 
Of ten ( 1) (0) 
6 6 
Var ies (2) (2) 
n = 24 
Percentages are o f  t o t al sampl e  and are l i s t ed on top. 
The number of cas es is in p ar enthe s e s  below.  
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LABOR I ND .  
41 3 
( 13) (1) 
0 0 
0 0 
(1) (1) 
LABOR IND. 
0 0 
(0) (0) 
12 3 
(4) (l) 
6 0 
(2) (0) 
18 0 
(6) (0) 
3 0 
(1) (0) 
0 0 
(0) (O) 
councill o r s .  A f inal reas o n  was that the case o r iginated from a 
p ar t icular councill o r's ward , and the M. P .  thought f o r  that reas o n  
t h e  councill o r  should be  cons ul ted . 
As we no ted b e fo r e , no t o nly d o  M. P . s refer cases to 
councillors , but  councillors also refer cas es to M . P . s .  We can s e e  
f rom Tab l e  4 that r e fe rr al s  o f  the latter kind seem to  occur l e s s
f r equently than t hose o f  the f o rmer. Hal f  of  the councillors we 
spoke t o  h ad never s ent a case o n  to  the M. P . ,  and amo ng those who 
h ad ,  very few ever r e f e rred more than t e n  cases a year to the M. P .  
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Once again, i t  is impo r t ant to see the p ar t is an l ines o f  cooperatio n. 
Labour councillors were more likely to hav e  r e f erred a case to the 
Labour Member , and Co nservat ives to the Co ns ervat ive Member.  
App arentl y ,  the r e l uct ance to p as s  cases to those o ut s id e  the party 
extend s  in b o t h  d irect io ns.  
(INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE]
Mos t  of the explana t i ons given for r e f e rring a case to
the M. P .  were related to the M . P .  ' s  natio nal pos i t i o n .  Fo r examp l e , 
o ne was that the Memb er had a cces s  to the Ministers of nat ional
depar tments and could b r ing a t t e n t i o n  at the h ighes t  level  to a 
cas e.  Th is reas o n  was ci ted b y  councill o rs i n  b oth p ar t i es . 
I n  add i t ion, the Member o f t e n  h ad informat jo n  o n  nat i onal policies 
whi ch the d is trict o r  cou nty councillo r could no t get o n  his o r  
h e r  own. Fi nally,  there were those who referred cas es to the M . P . 
because they thought that j t was hi.s proper responsibility, wh ich 
TABLE S 
REFERRALS OF CASES FROM COUNCILLORS TO M.P. 
ALL CONS. LAB. IND. 
Yes , to Lab. 33 7 23 3 
(10) ( 2) (7) (1) 
Y e s ,  to Co ns . 17 13 0 3 
(S) (4) (1) 
No so 33 17 0 
(lS) (1 0) (S) 
n = 30 
TABLE 6 
FREQUENCY OF REFERRALS FROM COUNCILLORS TO M.P. 
ALL CONS. LAB. IND. 
Very Infrequ e nt 6 3 0 3 
(1 p e r  y ear or (2) (1) (O) (1) 
l e s s )  
2-10 18 3 1 2  3 
(6) (1) (4) (1) 
7-11 9 6 3 0 
(3) ( 2) (1) (0) 
Often 3 0 3 0 
(1) (O) (1) (0) 
Varie s  3 3 0 0 
(1) (1) (0) (O) 
Neve r  so 30 20 
(17) (10) (7) (O) 
n = 24 
P e rce ntages are o f  t o t al sample and are l is ted o n  top. 
The number o f  cas es i s  i n  pare ntheses below. 
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usual ly mennt Lha t the cas e did no t fall within normal ju ris d i ction 
o f  the council. 
Bea ring in mind the partis an nat ure of casework 
i nt e ract ions in this cons t i t uency , it is  no t s u rp rising that the 
councillors we talked to f e l t  that their worki ng re lat ionship 
with the M.P. was much clo s e r  when the M.P. be longed to their 
p arty . All o f  the Labour cou nci llors s a id that they had had good 
wo rking relationships with the Labour M.P. while the majo r i ty of 
the Co ns erva t ive Councillo rs (11 out o f  14) felt that their
worki ng rel a t i ons hips w i th h im h ad b e e n  d is t ant , o r  i n  s everal 
ins t a nce s , nonex i s t ant . Convers e ly , mos t  o f  the Cons ervat ive 
cou nci l lors (again,  11 o ut of 14) s aid t h at they had good working 
re lationships with the newly elected Conservative M.P. whi l e  all 
the Labour counci l lo rs said that they did no t .  Of the two
i ndependents in our s ample , one re po rt ed good worki ng rel a t ionships 
with one o f  the two M. P . s. 
The amb ivalence o f  the loca l  conUTiu ni ty to the Labour 
Member's expanded cons t i t u e ncy role is most evi dent i n  the responses 
to the q ues t i o n, "What do you t h i nk is the proper r o l e  of the 
M . P .  in the cons t i t ue ncy?" Some were qui te ent husiasti c  about 
h av ing an M.P. who was clos ely i nvolved i n  the cons t it uency 's 
affai rs . They f e l t  that the Labour Member provided an exce l l e nt 
rol e  model, and t he i r  description of h ow a n  M.P. should ideally 
behave w as clearly d rawn from h i s  examp l e . Typ i ca l  remarks f rom 
thos e hold ing this view w e re that "the M.P. shouJd be accessible 
to hi s cons titu e nts , "  " co ns t i tuents should come firs t," "the M.P. 
should be about a lot in the co nstituency," "the M.P. should play 
two roles -- national and local," "the M.P. should fight for the 
rights of people in the co nstituency," "the M.P. should lo o k  after 
the constituency in Parliament to get it what it wants," or simply 
that the Member "should be a good co nstituency M.P." 
The opposing view was that the Labour Member's 
constituency role had been excessive, and that M.P.s should 
concentrate on national matters. Those who held this general 
position d id so with vary ing d e grees of extremity . A few, the 
mod erates, believed that the M.P. should be a co urt of last resort 
on local matters, intervening only after o ther means of red ress 
have been exhausted. In their ey es, the Labour Member's excess 
was taking up local cases in the first instance, and what was 
worse, actively seeking them o ut. The M.P.'s role, they thought, 
should be more oriented towards national responsibilities. The 
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Me mber can best maintain a balance by representing the constituency 
in Parliament primarily , and only o c casionally interfering in the 
affairs or the county or district council. As one of those we 
interviewed told us, an M.P. "should concentrate on national 
affairs an d do enough locally to k ee p his constituents happy." 
The Labour Member had upset this balance by reguLirly interfering 
in local matters. 
A more extreme version of this general view was that 
M.P. 's should dc;1l with natio1wl issues exclusively and not g0t 
at all involved in constituency affairs. Ac cording to this 
version, the M.r. is elected to Parli<Iment to ca rry out party 
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principles and deliberate on national issues, no t to do case work. 
Lo cal matters should be left to the councillors. Examples of this 
position are such statements as "the M.P. should represent the 
national party in central government, " the "M.P. should n't be de aling 
with lo cal matters since it d iverts too much of his time from 
nation<Il issues," "the M.P. shouldn't get involved in the 
co uncillor's problems," the "M.P. shouldn't allo w himself to be 
d ictated to by his constituents," "the M.P. should be putting 
forward the case f or issues," and "the M.P. should stick to 
Parliamentary duties and not waste time on cases." As one of 
them put it, unlike the previous M.P., the id eal M.P. "should keep 
o ut of the way " and no t "jump o n  every local band wago n." 
Taking all the responses together, we d eveloped eight 
categories and record ed the frequency with which each was mentio ned. 
This is shown in Table 7. The mo d al response was that an M.P. should 
be available to his o r  her co nstituents as much as po ssible. This 
was suggested by councillors from both parties, but most o ften by 
Labour. The second most frequent response was that the Member should 
represent constituency interests in Parliament, which includes such 
activities as lobbying ministers about co nstituency pro blems, raising 
questions in Parliament and brinRing publicity to local problems. 
As with the category of "being available," Labour councillors tended 
to be more likely than Conservative co uncillors to mention "representing 
co nstituency interests" as important. Conservative councillors, on 
the other hand, were more inclined to say that the M.P. should 
concentrate on rarliamentary duti es primarily .  They were also more 
TABLE 7 
PROPER ROLE OF M. P .  
/\LL CONSERVATIVE LABOR 
Represent l 'l 10 31 
Const iluency Int erest (11) (3) (8) 
Available to  30 21 42 
C i t i zens (17) (6) (11) 
Party Pr ima ry 9 10 8 
(5) (J) (2) 
Local 7 10 4 
(4 )  (J) (1) 
Parl imentary 18 27 8 Primary (10) (8) (2) 
Lo cal 3 0 8 
(2) (2) 
Inform C i t i zens 10 17 0 
(6) (5) 
General  4 J 0 
Represen tation (2) (l) 
n ; 57 
Percentages are column based a nd are li sted on top.  
Number o f  ca�es are listed in parentheses. 
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INDEPENDENT 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
50 
(1) 
50 
(1) 
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likely to ment i on the Member's in forma t ional role -- that is, answering 
querie s  and keeping citizens informed abou t government pol icies --
and to say tha t the M . P .  should a c t  as a backup , or rou te  o f  appeal
for local cases which the counc i l lors could no t reso lve in the f ir s t  
instanc e .  In fac t ,  looking a t  t h e  overall p a t t er n, Labour councillo r s  
app ear to  have been more likely t o  men t io n  const i t uency-orient ed 
func t ions than the Conservat ive councillors, and moreover, those 
c o ns t it uency func t ions which the Conserva t ive cou nc i llors d id ment ion 
such as provid ing informa t io n  to c i t i zens and serving as a backup to 
counc i llor s  -- implied somewhat less interf erenc e  in loc al a f fairs. 
As far as one c a n  tell f rom the evidence,  therefore, the 
Labour Member's constituenc y involvemen t had a significant impa c t  
u p o n  the councillors in his consti tuenc y. Cooperation between the 
Memb er and the counc i llors -- e specia lly Labour -- occurred f requently 
a s  c a se s  passed in both d irect ions b e tween them. The Labour Member's 
w i l lingne ss to h and le cases of a l l  k i nd s  i ncreased the counc illors' 
c a se load . The c ounc i llors themselves were divid ed i n  their assessment 
of his c onst i tuenc y  st yle . Many praised h im for h is responsiveness 
to  const it uenc y  int erests, but others -- most l y  Conserva t ive , b u t  
inc luding some Labour councillors - - though t  h i s  interfer e nce exce ssive 
a nd felt  that he should have stuck to nat io na l  a f fair s .  
THE INTERACTION O F  CANDIDATE STRATECIES 
The M . P .  's st yle o f  represen t a t ion can a f fect  the 
st rategy and b ehavi or o f  opponents as well as that o f  communi t y  
politicians and official s. The Conservat ives feared that the
Labour Memb er's high name r e cogni tion might cr eate a personal 
f o l l o wing in the consti tuency that wou l d  make it difficu l t  to 
uns eat him . In pre paration f o r  the 1979 e l e ction , they initially
adopted a nationally prominent journal i s t  as their can didate who 
was well vers e d  in national is sues and an e xce l l ent s peaker,  a nd 
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for those reasons had ma de an impress ive s howing before the 
selection committee .  Three weeks a f te r  his adoption, howeve r ,  there 
was cons iderable dissati s f a ction with hi s candi dacy ins i de the 
party. Many of the activists fe l t  that he lacked the personal 
touch and the wi l ingness to f ight the campaign effectively at the 
local leve l .  He was sub s e quently dropped as thei r  candi da te i n  
favor of a barr i s ter who had l iv ed i n  the consti tuency a l l  his l if e .
The new Cons ervative candi date f e l t  at the time that 
he "ha d to g ive him a taste of his own medi cine" i f  he was to 
s ucceed in the e l e ction s ince the Lab our Memb er was so w e l l  known 
that "he might have beaten the national trend. " Cons e quentl y , 
the Conservative candi date b egan attending as many cons tituency 
functions as he coul d  an d doing casework. The people w ho came 
to him with their prob l ems , he to l d  us , did so b e caus e they 
were Conservatives who wante d the i r  cas es handl e d  by a f e l low 
Conservative .  ln retro spect, the Cons ervative Member feels that he 
overes timate d hi s opponent ' s  personal f o l lowing . It is even 
pos s ib l e ,  he contends ,  that his opponent was hur t  by the 
exces s ive pub l icity of his cons ti tuency activities . 
Whi le the Conservative M emb e r  s us pe cts the utili ty 
of heavy cons tituency invo lvement, he has found that in o f f i ce he 
is captive o( the expecta tio ns �reated by his predecessors. 
Having had a very consti tuency ori ented M . P.,  peopl e in the 
consti tuency expect him to as s ume the s ame level o f  casework
activ i ty .  H e nce, though he do ubts the pol itical value o f  
cas ework and does not think that that i s  what he was really 
electe d  to do , he has b een fo rce d  by circums tances into a dopting 
a s ty le s imilar to his prede cess o r's. 
T his poi nt is i l lus trate d  in Tab l e  8 which compares 
the activities o f  both the defeated Labour and new l y  e l e cte d 
Cons ervative M . P .  with those o f  the average M . P .  In a lmost 
every category , both maintained a higher than average l evels o f  
activity .  The notab le exception i s  the below average numb er o f  
cases the Conservative Member reported that he handl e d  per week , 
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but this can be expl a i ne d  by the fact that at the time o f  the 
inte rview ,  he ha d j us t  been e l e cted and had not y e t  ful ly es tabl i shed 
hims e l f . Looking at the tabl e  closely,  both hel d  surgeries e very 
week, putting them in the upper 16 percent o f  a l l  M . P . s  in terms of 
f requency o f  surgeries . Both moved the i r  surgeries around to dif ferent 
l o cations in o r der to reach constituents from all corners of the 
constituency . Both actively s o l i cited case s .  The Labour Member 
did this through v i s its to di f f erent neighborhoods in a mobil e  van 
and by knocking on door s .  The Conservative Association put out a 
"May I hel p  you" pamphle t  encouraging cons tituents to s end their 
complaints to the Conservative Member and made a series o f  pub lici ze d  
wal kabouts i n  town . Neither expressed any reluctance about handl ing 
l ocal case s ,  a lthough both woul d  refer cas e s  to councillors when they 
TABLE 8 
A COMPARISON OF THE CONSTITUENCY ACTIVITIES 
OF THE CONSERVATIVE AND LABOUR MEMBERS
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LA BOU R M. P .  CONS ERVATIVE M . l' .  NAT IONAL AVERAGE 
Number of cases 
hand led 
Number o f  surgeries 
per year 
S eeks out 
cases 
Handles l oc a l  
cases rou tinely 
Types o f  cases 
hand led 
Number of  S t a f f  
8 0  p . w .  
l p . w .  
yes 
yes 
l. Hous ing
2 .  DHSS 
1 p . t .  secretary
l p. t .  a gcent 
volunteers 
2 5  p . w .  
1 p . w.
yes 
yes 
1. Hous ing
2 .  l'am i l y  and 
l egal
3. DHSS
4 .  Educat ion 
1 f .  t .  s e c re t n ry 
in Wes tm i n i s t e r  
1 f . t .  a gent and 
s upport 
2 1 / 2  o f f ice worke rs 
Volunteers 
45  p . w. 
1 p . w . =16% 
yes=30% 
yes=68% 
l. . Hou s ing
2 .  DH S S  
3 .  Tax 
4 .  Legal 
2 o r  less s t a f f  
=66% 
NOTE : Source o f  n a t i onal  figures ;.ire C a i n ,  Fe re_j oh n ,  oncl F i o ri na 
s u rvey o f  1 0 7  M . P . s  and agents conducted i n  s ummer o f  1 9 7 9 .
thought i t  was appropriate or  might help t h e  cas e .  I n  terms o f  the 
types of cases th ey were receiving , both ind ic a t ed that hous ing was 
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the mos t  f r equent sort of comp l a int , which is con s i s t ent  with nat i onal 
f ind ings . As i d e  from the numb er of cases , the only other impor tant
d i f f erence be tween them was tha t the Conserva t ive Member enj oys 
considerably greater s t a f f  suppor t than d i d  the Labour Member . 
Ironica l ly , the Conserva t ive Member found that his  advantage in 
s upport did no t free him f rom casework : he t o ld us that he d id no t 
feel  that he could turn cases over to his s t a f f  because people in  
the cons t i tuency had come t o  exp e c t  the personal a t tent ion o f  the 
Membe r .  
One can see then how a Member ' s  s ty l e  can b e  d i c t a ted 
to h im by the exp e c t at ions of  his cons t i tuents and the behavior of 
his predecessor. The Conserva t ive Member wanted t o  pursue a mor e  
na t iona l l y  ori ented rep res enta tional s tyl e ,  but could no t ignore 
the legacy of his predecess o r ' s  ac t i v i t i es . There appears to b e
a logic o f  escala t i on inherent in  gras s roots p o l i t ics : as a 
cand idate  tries to match the advantage the o ther h as gai ned through 
cons t i tuency s e rv i c e ,  the level of pub lic  expec tat i ons increases , 
and the demands of the Member ' s  j ob s h i f t  in important and unintended 
way s .  S uch , it appears , was the expe rience in this cons t i tuency . 
CONCLUS ION 
Th i s  case s tudy has ana l y zed the impa ct of an M . P .  ' s
cons t i tuency a c t ivi t i es upon his loc a l  commun i ty .  There a re 
seve r a l  o b s e rv� t i n ns wh i rh can be d rawn f rom this exercis e . 
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First, in th i s  c onstitue ncy , much of th e M . P .  ' s c as ew o rk ac tiv i ty 
was in f l uence d by the str e ngth of party d iv i si ons . The partisansh ip 
of cooper ation at th e local l eve l in G r e at Br itai n is certainty not 
a surpr ising findi ng, but i t  d oe s  c ontrast sharpl y with th e 
American patte rn of constituency serv ic e ,  which i s  lar ge l y  free 
from p ar tisan influ e nc e .  
Mode l s  o f  c onsti tue ncy serv ice in the U .S .  d e pict a 
triangul ar p a ttern of cooper ation be twe e n  three actor s .  Cit iz ens 
seek h e lp f or their problems w ith th e bureauc racy , pol i ti ci ans 
hand le case s in the h ope that it w il l  h e l p  t h em ge t r e e l e c te d ,  and 
bur e aucr ats develop close ties w ith le g islator s in or der to de f end 
the interests of th e ir a g e nc y  ( F ior i na ,  19 7 7) . Partisan inf l ue nce 
is vi rtually nonex iste nt in this mode l .  I n  the Br itish c onsti tue ncy 
we stu d i e d, h owe ve r ,  the par ty play e d  a major r ole . An important 
re ason f or h a nd ling c i tiz e n  complaints -- apar t f r om the 
e l e ctoral -- was to satisfy the e x pe ctations o f  p arty a ctivists. 
Party was also a factor in th e se nse that some voters i n  the 
constitue ncy f e l t  u ne asy about br inging th e ir problems to an M.P. 
who d i d  not be lo ng to th e ir par ty . O r , to speak of anoth e r  exampl e ,  
cooperation betw e e n  M . P . s and c ouncillors o n  c onstituent case s 
o c c urr e d  pr i mar i l y  wi th i n  par ty line s .  Cle arl y , party c annot be 
le f t  out of the Br i ti sh mode l .  
A s e c o nd obse rvati on is that v e ry c l ose i nvol v e me nt by 
the M . P .  in t h e  a f f a i rs of the l oc a l  c o un c i l  c a n  C o u s e  tensions 
to ari s e  between th e M . 1' .  <i n d  l oc a l. C < • un c .i l l o rs or p e niw nent
o t  F i e  Li l s . A fL·w o t  t h e •  c o u nt· i ll o rs f rom tl i< •  l. a h » 1 1 1· Mternbc,> r ' s  
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ow n p arty fe l t  that the r i g ht f ul f oc u s  o f  the M . P .  w a s  exc l us ively  
national an d w ou l d  h ave p re ferr e d  hav i ng the Me mbe r l eave local 
ma tt ers to the c ou nc i llors. Seve ral loc al pe rman e n t  of f i c i als al so 
ex presse d c oncern w i th the L abour Me mbe r's i nvolvemen t  in c ou nc il 
matter s  and w i th h is pr ac tice of publ i ci z i n g  the i r  mi stak e s .  I t  
would ap pear th at the M.P . mus t  c ar e f ull y conside r the trade- of f 
betw e e n  maintai n i n g  su f f i c iantly good r e l ati ons w ith loc a l  permanent 
of f ic i a ls i n  orde r to secure their c ooperation an d threate n i ng 
th e m  w ith exposure w h e n  nece ssar y  f or the r e sol uti on of a case . 
Th is may be a di f f icu l t  bal ance to ma intain . 
Finally , a maj or e f f e c t  of di ligen t  casewo rk se e ms t o  
be that i t  gene rates h igh e x pe c tations f or th ose s er v ic e s  among 
consti tue nts. What i s  e x pe cte d of newly e l e c te d  M . P . s de pen d s  in 
par t  upon the patte r n  set by the ir pre de ce ss or s. An M.P. who is 
activel y  involv e d  in h is constituency sets the pace f or h is succe ssor .  
The f e ar o f  getting a r e putation f or be i ng a bad constituency man may 
be as strong as the ince ntive of positive gains f r om being a good 
constitue ncy man. In the e r a  of new r ee l e ction proce d ur e s ,  the ne e d  
t o  attent t o  one's constitue ncy af f air s i n  or der t o  avoid a bad 
r eputation may be come ven more impor tant. The M.P. who h as good 
per sonal r e lations with his or her local par ty and a reputation of 
concern for the c onsti tuenc y  may be l e ss v u lne rable to u nseating by 
militant acti v i s ts .  I f  so, the e f f ect may be to incre ase the l ev e l  
o f  const itue ncy r e s p ons ibilitie s .
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